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Resumo 
Os programas de transferência condicionada de renda têm se disseminado nos países subdesenvolvidos 
e em desenvolvimento como forma de aliviar a pobreza (transferência de renda) e fornecer 
investimento em capital humano para levar as famílias a atingirem melhores condições de vida no 
longo prazo, através das condicionalidades. Esses programas, no entanto, podem também afetar a 
alocação do tempo dentro da família beneficiária. Usando dados da PNAD de 2003, mediu-se o 
impacto do programa Bolsa Escola no trabalho das crianças e dos pais nas famílias beneficiadas. 
Utilizando como grupo controle as famílias elegíveis, mas não beneficiadas, e estimando-se um modelo 
probit, observa-se uma redução do trabalho de crianças de 6 a 15 anos e aumento da freqüência escolar. 
Ademais, ocorre aumento da participação dos pais no mercado de trabalho. Esses resultados são 
confirmados ao se utilizar a técnica de propensity score matching. 
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Abstract 
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs have become widespread in developing and 
underdeveloped countries as a way to alleviate current poverty and provide investments in human 
capital that could lead families to better life conditions in the long-term. However, these programs may 
also have impacts on time use decisions within beneficiary household/families, particularly with 
respect to time spent working. Using data from 2003,  we aim to measure the impact of the Brazilian 
Bolsa Escola conditional cash transfer program on children’s and parents’ labor status using the 
econometric framework of policy evaluation. Probit regressions and propensity score matching 
methods show that this program reduces the probability of work for children ages 6-15, increase school 
enrollment and increase mother and father participation in the labor force.  
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THE IMPACT OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS ON HOUSEHOLD 
WORK DECISIONS IN BRAZIL 
 
Introduction 
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs have become widespread in developing and 
underdeveloped countries as a way to alleviate current poverty and provide investments in human 
capital that could lead families to better life conditions in the long-term. The first goal is accomplished 
when poor families receive money from governments on a monthly basis, as a complementary income 
source. The second goal is reached by conditioning the cash transfers on certain behaviors, such as 
visiting health facilities, immunizing children, and enrolling children in school. However, these 
programs may also have a huge impact on time use decisions within recipient families, particularly 
with respect to time spent working. In this paper, we aim to measure the impact of the Bolsa Escola 
(School Grant) conditional cash transfer program on children and parents’ labor status in Brazil. 
Although this program was subsumed into the broader Bolsa Familia (Family Grant) program in 2004, 
we use survey data from 2003, before that restructuring occurred. 
Policy makers want social programs to alleviate poverty without causing beneficiaries to become 
dependent on the program. The problem with cash transfers is that when the flow stops, families return 
to poverty. One solution is to stimulate families to use the money that they receive from social 
programs to invest in family members’ human capital. In this way, they may have better opportunities 
in the future when the transfers stop, since, as is well known, education is highly correlated with 
earnings. Thus, conditioning a cash transfer program on behaviors that represent investment in human 
capital adds long-term dimensions to a short-term income transfer policy. 
Poor families with children of school-going age (15 years) or younger are eligible for the conditional 
cash transfer program in Brazil. The government pays a monthly grant to the children’s mother, 
conditional on certain requirements being met: school-age children have to be enrolled and have to 
attend a certain percentage (85%) of school days during the month; children have to visit health care 
facilities for checks of their nutritional and developmental status; parents must attend workshops 
regarding health and healthy behavior, and so forth.   
Although those programs are concerned with long-term investments in human capital, CCT programs 
may influence current family decisions as well.  We are interested in whether Bolsa Escola affects how 
family members allocate activities and resources among themselves. In other words, if a child used to 
work in the paid labor force, thereby earning income, and now he/she has to spend a certain amount of 
time in school, someone else in the family may have to produce more income. Alternatively, child 
leisure time or time spent in household chores may be reduced to allow school attendance, without 
changing a child’s labor force hours. In theory, CCT programs may affect time allocation decisions for 
all members of the family. Another aspect of work decisions and cash transfer programs is that when 
the economic status of the family improves, for any reason, it may find itself ineligible to continue 
receiving the CCT benefits.  In particular, a better job or more hours of employment for one or more 
family members may increase family income enough, that they may lose program eligibility.  In the 
face of this possibility, adults may choose not to increase their paid work in order to continue receiving 
the transfers.   3
Economically speaking, because benefits are linked to children’s school attendance, the relative value 
(or shadow price) of time spent in school increases, and the relative values of all other activities 
performed by children, including labor force work, tend to decrease. This effect would be consistent 
with goals of the Brazilian government regarding children’s labor force work:  anti-child-labor 
campaigns have been highly visible in Brazil since the mid-1990s (Arends-Kuenning, Kassouf and 
Fava 2005).  However, we do not have enough information about the characteristics of the work of 
particular children to judge whether they are, on the whole, harmful or beneficial for the children in 
question.  When we use the term “child labor” in this paper, we do not do so in a pejorative sense as is 
often done to indicate harmful or dangerous work; “child labor” and “child work” are used 
interchangeably with no value judgment.  
The total effect of the transfers can be decomposed into two effects: an income effect and a substitution 
effect. The income effect implies that an increase in household resources (due to cash transfers) leads 
family members to increase their consumption of normal goods (such as leisure and education). The 
substitution effect implies a decrease in the demand for substitutes for schooling and an increase in the 
demand for goods or services that are complementary to school. In general, we would expect cash 
transfers to result in an increase in the consumption of notebooks and pencils and – if work and school 
are substitutes – a decrease in the time that children spend working. If, however, work and school are 
complementary rather than substitutes, the effects of cash transfers on child labor will be ambiguous 
(Ravallion and Wodon, 2000). 
Whether or not labor force work and school are complements or substitutes is an empirical matter that 
is likely to be context-specific.  In Brazil, public schools often function in shifts, and children may 
work before or after the four hours (or so) that they spend in school each day that they attend.  In 
Brazil, in fact, more working children attend school than not:  In 2003, 9.26 percent of 10-14 year-old 
children combined school and labor force employment.  Another 88.16 percent went to school (only), 
0.55 percent did labor force work (only), and 2.02 percent were not recorded as doing either, according 
to PNAD-2003 data.
1 School and work may be complementary not only in the sense of both fitting into 
the same day; there may be true complementarities when on-the-job learning makes particular kinds of 
school learning more comprehensible and valuable for children, or when, for example, numeracy 
increases marketable skills.  The quality of local schools, especially those attended by poor children, as 
well as local labor market possibilities must, logically, affect the degree of substitutability between 
school and work for children eligible for cash grants. 
Adult labor supply may also be affected. Considering adult labor supply in a simple static model in 
which individual utility depends on consumption and leisure, the income effect would lead to reduced 
time spent on work, because in the presence of cash transfers individuals can afford to purchase more 
goods. Nevertheless, in a family labor supply model, time allocation of every member will depend on 
the value of time of all other members. The question now is how cash transfers affect the work of other 
family members if work and school are substitutes for children. 
One possible answer, considering a family acting as a unit, is that when children stop or reduce their 
work activities, there will be less labor supplied by members of their family, in total. This would imply 
                                                 
1 For 6-15 year olds, we observe 7.02% doing both school and labor force work; 88.69% in school only; 0.65% at work 
only; and 3.65% neither in school nor working. The higher number for the last category is due to the presence 6 year-old 
children, who were not obligated to be in school. 
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that the relative price of work would be higher for the whole family. This would, in turn, lead to an 
increase in the hours worked by other (non-child) family members. Still, some ambiguity in the final 
result can arise due to the own-income effect of CCT grants on adult labor supply (Parker and Skoufias, 
2000).  The final outcome is an empirical matter; it may, in fact, vary from family to family. 
The preceding discussion has implicitly assumed a Becker-style household time allocation model 
(Becker, 1965), where all household members either agree on their joint time use allocation or where 
there is an altruistic dictator.  Although a model incorporating conflict and family dynamics would be 
more realistic (see, for example, Quisumbing 2003), our data unfortunately cannot support the 
incorporation of such details.   
Evidence from studies of conditional cash transfer programs 
A number of studies have shown that CCT programs in Latin America improve student educational 
outcomes, but there are relatively few analyses of the impact of CCT programs on child labor. 
Maluccio and Flores (2004), using a double-difference estimator, found that Nicaragua’s Red de 
Proteccion Social program raised enrollment by 17.7 percentage points and reduced the number of 
children ages 7-13 working by 4.9 percentage points.  Attanasio et al (2006) estimated a positive 
impact of Colombia’s Familias en Accíon program on school participation enrolment and a negative 
impact on children participation in domestic work. However, child participation in income-generating 
work remained almost unaffected by the Colombian program. Duryea and Morrison (2004) estimated 
that the Superémonos  CCT program in Costa Rica increased children school attendance, but again they 
found no evidence that the program decreased child labor. 
Evaluating the impact of the Food for Education (FFE) program, implemented in 1994 in Bangladesh, 
on child labor and schooling, Ravallion and Wodon (2000) found a positive effect on school attendance 
and a negative effect on child labor. However, they noted that the decrease in labor time corresponded 
to a small share of the increase of schooling time, indicating that time dedicated to school was mainly 
subtracted from leisure and not from work time. 
The Mexican PROGRESA (Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación – Education, Health and 
Nutrition Program) CCT Program began in 1997 and continues under the name of Oportunidades. For 
purposes of evaluation, PROGRESA was implemented with an experimental design, with treatment 
and control groups randomly assigned. Thus, it was possible to accurately evaluate the impacts of this 
program, and it has become the most important reference for program evaluation research of its kind. 
The Mexican CCT program achieved its goals of increasing school enrollment and attendance and 
reducing children’s participation in labor force work (Schultz, 2001). Regarding parents’ labor status, 
mothers’ and fathers’ work decisions were not affected by the transfers, it seems, mainly because their 
program eligibility was determined only once for the following three years and was not regularly re-
evaluated (Parker and Skoufias, 2000). 
Both ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of the Bolsa Escola Program on school attendance and child labor 
are available (Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite, 2002; Cardoso and Souza, 2003; Ferro and Kassouf, 
2005). The conclusions are all the same: Brazil’s CCT program has a big impact on increasing school 
enrollment – although it is not possible to assess the quality of education received – but it has no 
influence on child labor. The ex-post evaluations, however, took place using data collected more or less 
coincidentally with the widespread implementation of Bolsa Escola in 2001:  they relied upon the 2000 
Demographic Census) and the 2001 PNAD, or  National Household Sample Survey. Another weakness 
is that the PNAD-2001 asked if individuals were “signed-up for or a beneficiary of” a cash transfer   5
program conditioning on education. Thus, the analysis using PNAD-2001 may have considered as 
“treated” someone who was not actually receiving the benefits but rather still on the waiting list for 
Bolsa Escola. 
The Bolsa Escola Program. The Brazilian experience with CCT programs started with the Renda 
Mínima (Minimum Income) program in the city of Campinas and the Bolsa Escola (School Grant) 
program in Brasília, both in 1995. The programs consisted of cash transfers to guarantee a minimum 
income level for poor families, conditional on child school attendance. Between 1995 and 1999 other 
cities adopted the same model of social programming, based on the positive experiences of their 
predecessors. 
In April 2001 the Brazilian federal government launched Bolsa Escola as a national conditional cash 
transfer program focused on education. In order to be eligible to receive a transfer, a family had to have 
a per capita income below one-half of a Brazilian minimum salary (i.e., below the usual Brazilian 
poverty line) and had to include individuals aged 6 to 15. It paid 15 Reais (approximately US$ 6) for 
each child attending at least 85 percent of school days, with payments for a maximum of three children 
per family to avoid incentives for fertility increases. 
Most CCT programs do not aim to fully compensate children’s earnings.  In 2003, the grant per child 
(for up to three children per family) was 15 Reais. In Brazil overall in 2003, when children were paid 
for their work, they earned on average 100 Reais per month, or about 4 Reais per hour  (rural children 
and girls earned less than urban children and boys).  However, many children are unpaid workers; other 
low-income children are unemployed or out of the labor force; and yet other paid workers may 
continue to work in non-school hours.  Without longitudinal data, it is not possible to figure out 
whether  Bolsa Escola has increased household income for poor families with children or led to 
decreases in total income due to reduced child earnings.  It is also possible that a smaller amount of 
income will be put to better use when it is controlled to a greater extent by children’s mothers 
(Quisumbing 2003).  
 
In January 2004, the Brazilian government merged four cash transfer programs, including Bolsa 
Escola, in the same administrative / management set, implementing the Bolsa Família  (Family Grant) 
program.  Characteristics of the school grant program remained essentially the same, but requirements 
for program participation increased to include pre-natal care and vaccinations for children ages 0-6 as 
the program was broadened to include poor families without 6-15 year-olds.   
 
The implementation of a Bolsa cash transfer is done initially through the Federal government, which 
establishes a quota on the number of federally-financed stipends that a municipality can provide to its 
population.  To enroll in the program, families must fill out an application, available at the city hall of 
their municipality, that requests information on income and household composition.  The information 
determines admission to the program, subject to the municipio’s budget for the program.  The 




De Janvry et al (2005) analyzed the Bolsa Escola program with respect to targeting, monitoring and 
accountability.  They used data from 261 municipalities that were randomly selected out of more than 
                                                 
2 de Janvry et al. (2005) report that in almost all municipios the number of potential beneficiaries greatly exceeded the 
number of beneficiaries they could fund with the budget allocated by the central government.   6
5500 municipalities in four states of Northeast Brazil. They concluded that there is considerable 
variation across municipalities in implementation quality and strategies.  However, according to the 
authors, “there was considerable transparency with respect to the beneficiary identification and 
selection process, with ample dissemination, public knowledge, and information on the criteria used”. 
Program evaluation methodology. The main issue in program evaluation is finding a good comparison 
group. When programs have experimental designs in which treatment and control groups are randomly 
assigned, we can assume that the primary difference between the participants (treatment group) and 
non-participants (control group) is their participation in the program. Thus, the differences between 
their outcomes after treatment (finding a new job, school enrollment, children reducing work hours 
etc.) are due to the treatment – in this case, participation in Bolsa Escola.  Like most social programs, 
however, Bolsa Escola did not have an experimental design, so we need to find a substitute for the 
random control group – a “good” comparison group. 
Finding a comparison group depends in part on how the program works. CCT programs in Brazil are 
mostly funded by federal resources, but municipalities are in charge of parts of the bureaucratic 
process. First, the family has to meet the eligibility criteria: have children of school age (6 to 15 years) 
and have a monthly per capita income lower than one-half of a national minimum salary.
3 Eligible 
families can sign-up for the program, and if their requests are approved, they will receive monthly 
transfers if their children attend at least 85 percent of school days during the month. 
Schools have to inform the Ministry of Education about the attendance of beneficiary students. The 
Ministry of Education consolidates the information coming from all Brazilian schools and sends it to 
the Ministry of Social Development, which orders the payments. The payment is made directly to the 
beneficiaries through magnetic cards – it works as if the beneficiary had a special bank account for the 
transfer. Beneficiaries can get cash from Federal Bank tellers, ATMs, Post Offices and authorized retail 
stores, so the magnetic cards are supposed to work even in the poorest and most technological delayed 
regions
4. 
The “irregular” part of the process is the selection of the beneficiary families. The selection process is 
decentralized to the city level. Families have to meet the same national eligibility criteria, but cities can 
vary the processes of publicity, application, selection and approval. In general a city’s Social 
Development Office is in charge of these duties. The Social Development Office may either send social 
workers to poor areas to visit families and offer the program or it may use another way of publicizing 
the program – such as distributing brochures, giving interviews on community radio stations, or using 
cars with loud speakers in targeted neighborhoods – and wait for interested families. If municipalities 
want to reach the program’s target population with the lowest cost, the second approach is more likely 
to be used. 
Non-governmental organizations dealing with poverty-relief and educational issues are also engaged in 
providing program information and helping eligible families through the process.  Other people hear of 
the program through other routes.  For example, if they go to their political representatives to ask for 
                                                 
3 Monthly minimum salaries are set by the federal government.  One minimum salary is approximately the amount of 
income that an adult would need to earn by working full-time (8 hours per day, 5 days per week) for a month in order to 
meet basic (minimal) standards of living.  The minimum salary in 2003 was 240 reais or 82 dollars a month (exchange rate 
in September, 2003 was 1US$ = 2.92 Reais).  
4 This structure of direct payments is supposed to avoid corruption and deception, as beneficiaries do not need an 
intermediary in order to receive the money transfer.   7
help finding a job or paying for electricity or water bills, the city representatives may send them to the 
Social Development Office to check for eligibility in and apply for the CCT program. 
In spite of differences in the publicity and selection systems within municipalities, the overall strategy 
relies on the families’ willingness to participate. The mother or the father has to apply for and accept 
the conditions of the program.  Because of this, the comparison between beneficiary and eligible 
individuals may omit unobservable characteristics that lead some families to the program but not 
others.  This is known as the self-selection problem: some families want to participate while other 
families choose not to apply. 
One way to deal with the self-selection problem that arises from the comparison between beneficiary 
and eligible groups is to limit the analysis to a comparison between individuals who are in the program 
and individuals who have been found to be eligible, who have applied for the program, but who are not 
yet receiving benefits – that is, those who are on the waiting list. These people are waiting for 
bureaucratic processes to be completed; they are queuing for an opening in the quota-restricted 
program.  In other words, those who want to be participants but are not actually receiving the money 
can be considered a good comparison group, since they are likely to have similar unobservable 
characteristics to those already accepted into the program. 
There remain some concerns with using the waiting-list group as a comparison group.  Because 
program approval is on a first-come-first-served basis – given that the family meets the eligibility 
criteria – it is possible that persons who are already receiving the benefits have a stronger desire to 
participate or are more motivated than people who signed up later. In this case, the self-selection 
problem still exists within the treatment and comparison groups. However, after three years of the 
program, it has received a substantial amount of publicity.  Television commercials have shown 
beneficiary families being better-off due to transfers, and television is seen by most of Brazil’s 
population, including the poor.  The re-election campaign of incumbent president Luís Inácio Lula da 
Silva and other politicians emphasized the benefits of the Bolsa program to people’s lives.
5 We argue 
that information about the CCT program was very well diffused in Brazil by 2003.  By late 2003, in 
fact, Bolsa Escola was paying monthly stipends to over 8.6 million children from 5 million families.  In 
spite of this, Schwartzman (2005) asserts that 12 million 5-17 year-old persons were living on less than 
one dollar per day in Brazil in 2004.
6 Thus, we consider eligible signed-up families to be a good 
comparison group for beneficiaries. 
Data.  The 2003 Brazilian annual household survey, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios or 
PNAD-2003, included two questions regarding conditional cash transfers. One of the questions asked 
whether the person was signed-up for a cash transfer program conditional on education, and the other 
asked whether the person was actually receiving benefits in the form of cash transfers from such a 
program. The PNAD-2003, unlike previous PNAD survey, allows us to distinguish between those who 
want to be beneficiaries, i.e., those who are waiting for approval to start receiving benefits, and those 
who actually are beneficiaries and receive their transfers monthly. These two questions allow us to 
measure the impact of Brazilian conditional cash transfers on both child and parent work decisions 
through the analysis of treatment (eligible persons who are receiving benefits) and comparison (eligible 
                                                 
5 During election times, some politicians try to get the support of poor people by claiming that they are responsible for some 
social programs (or for the access to existing social programs), even if they are not. 
6 One dollar per day was a bit less than the poverty line of one-half minimum salary per month in 2003 (about $1.30 per 
day).    8
persons who are signed-up for the program and still waiting for approval) groups.  The treatment group 
will be described as “beneficiaries”, while the control or comparison group will be called “non-
beneficiaries”. 
The PNAD is a nationally representative sample survey. We focus this analysis on individuals between 
6 and 15 years of age who belong to families with per capita income levels below one-half of one 
Brazilian minimum wage (or below 120 Reais in September 2003)
7. Furthermore, we limit our sample 
to those who declared themselves signed-up for (comparison group) or a beneficiary of (treatment 
group) the CCT program and have complete information. Complete information indicates that we have 
non-missing information on the variables used in the analysis, including those about mothers and 
fathers.
8  Thus, our sample does not include potentially vulnerable mother-only or father-only 
households; we lose 28 percent of children because of this, or 4,090 observations. After dropping 
observations with incomplete information, our sample consisted of 14,434 children (4,230 controls and 
10,204 beneficiaries) of 8,202 parents (2,334 controls and 5,868 beneficiaries).
9 
Propensity score matching. Another methodological approach used in this study to estimate the effect 
of  Bolsa Escola on work participation and enrollment is propensity score matching. In this case, 
participants are explicitly matched with an individual in the non-participant (signed-up) group, in order 
to ensure that the outcomes are being compared between individuals who have similar a priori 
propensities of participating in the program. While the observations compared are very similar in terms 
of the probability of program participation, one limitation is that the sample size must be large in order 
to find statistically significant differences between treatment and control groups. However, this is not 
an impediment here, since we are dealing with a large household survey. 
To implement the propensity matching methodology, we used Stata statistical software with a routine 
(psmatch2) developed by E. Leuven and B. Sianesi (2003) to estimate treatment effects. The propensity 
score was based on variables that would affect program participation, such as age, family composition, 
parents’ education and age, geographical region and family income (without CCT benefits). 
Descriptive information 
Brazilian educational CCT programs target families with children from 6 to 15 years old; transfers may 
be received for up to three children per family. Based on the PNAD-2003 data, 67 percent of the urban 
children whose families want to participate in a CCT program are receiving the transfers. The 
percentage of beneficiaries in rural areas is higher than in urban areas (78 %). 
Labor force workers, by definition, are those who have spent at least one hour in the reference week in 
paid or unpaid work.  Contrary to what one might expect, program beneficiaries are more likely to 
work and to be enrolled in school than non-beneficiaries. Close to 13 percent of beneficiary children 
work, while less than 10 percent of non-beneficiaries work. Enrollment rate in both groups is very high, 
reaching 98 percent for beneficiaries and 96.5 percent for non-beneficiaries. (It is possible, however, 
                                                 
7 This corresponds to approximately US$ 41 at the September 2003 exchange rate (US$ / R$ = 2.92). 
8 We are able to find the actual mother, but not the father. Thus, we assign the male head or spouse to role of  “father” even 
though some of them are step-fathers or boyfriends rather than fathers. 
9 In urban areas, the sample includes 9,843 children (3,229 controls and 6,614 beneficiaries) and 5,661 parents (1,824 
controls and 3,837 beneficiaries).  In rural areas, it includes 4,591 children (1,001 controls and 3,590 beneficiaries) and 
2,541 parents (510 controls and 2,031 beneficiaries).   9
that attendance varies substantially between the two groups; this information is not available in PNAD-
2003.) 
Differences by urban and rural residence reflect typical patterns of child work, and breaking down the 
above statistics by urban-rural explains why the overall pattern is contrary to expectations. Among 
rural boys who are program beneficiaries, 49.1 percent are working, as compared to 52.9 percent of 
non-beneficiaries. Among boys in urban areas, 12.1 percent of beneficiaries and 18.8 percent of non-
beneficiaries are working. In general, girls work in the labor force less than boys, although they may do 
as many (or more) hours of work in total when non-labor-force work is taken into consideration. 
Among 11-15 year-olds, 20.9 percent of rural beneficiary girls and 6.9 percent of urban beneficiary 
girls work in the labor force, compared to 32.6 percent (rural) and 8.1 percent (urban) of non-
beneficiaries.  Thus, the overall pattern is explained by the fact that relatively more rural children are 
beneficiaries, because there is more poverty in rural areas.  Within urban and rural areas (separately), 
beneficiaries are less likely to work than non-beneficiaries.  
Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for the variables used in the children work participation equations 
and children’s enrollment equations. Means for the control and treatment groups, as well as for the 
whole sample are presented those for rural and urban areas. In addition to the program participation 
variables, a number of controls are included in these regressions, which are described in more detail 
below. We control for the child’s age, sex, and skin color.  Skin color is self-described by the survey’s 
respondents and includes the categories white, mulatto, black, yellow (that is, of Asian descent) and 
indigenous; we have recoded this into white and non-white. We also control for the ages and numbers 
of years of schooling completed by the child’s father and mother. (The age variable for the mother 
reflects the difference between her age and the father’s age, with a positive difference indicating that 
the mother is older.) Family composition is described with respect to the reference child and includes 
the number of her/his siblings by age and gender.  Region of residence is also controlled.  To estimate 
propensity scores, we used family per capita income net of CCT transfers. We did not control for 
family income in the probit regressions to avoid endogeneity problems, given that it is part of the 
criteria used to select beneficiaries.  Although we attempted to include non-earned income, this variable 
was frequently missing or zero to be usable.  
Comparing the means of the control variables for the treatment (beneficiary) and control (non-
beneficiary) groups in Table 1, we observe that the groups are similar in many ways; there is no 
statistical difference between close to half of the variables.  (An asterisk indicates no statistically 
significant difference between groups.) Moreover, when using the propensity score matching method, 
as shown in Table 2, practically all the means of the exogenous variables are the same across groups.   
Finally, we analyze the age difference between fathers and mothers. As suggested by Assaad, Levison 
and Zibani (2007), our hypothesis is that as the difference between fathers’ age and mothers’ age 
increases, fathers might increasingly dominate the relationship – and the household and family choices. 
Table 1 shows that urban mothers are in general 4 years younger than their spouses, while rural 
mothers are approximately 5 years younger. Mothers’ age ranges from 34 to 38 while average fathers’ 
age ranges from 38 to 43 years. Although the average age differences do not seem to be very large, 
they may have influence in the family decision-making. 
In order to increase mothers’ role as decision makers within their families, CCT benefits are generally 
paid to children’s mothers. There is evidence that mothers spend a higher proportion of their money on 
children’s education and health (Thomas and Strauss, 1992; Thomas, 1994). Also, when they have   10
some money that does not come from their husbands or other family members, they may have 
increased self-esteem, which would help them to express their opinions in the household.  
The per capita monthly income does not include children’s earnings and CCT benefits, but it does 
include all other sources of family income. Urban beneficiary families have a monthly per capita 
income of 60 Reais while non-beneficiary families’ average per capita income is 63 Reais. The overall 
averages are lower in rural areas, where beneficiary per capita income is 47 Reais per month compared 
to 53 Reais in non-beneficiary families. 
Children in non-beneficiary families seem to be better off than those in beneficiary families, since the 
former have slightly higher income levels. This may be indicative that the program is being 
appropriately targeted to poorer families. It is important to highlight that this sample contains only 
families found to be eligible for the CCT program – those that the Brazilian government considers to be 
under the official poverty line. 
Size is another important family background component. Urban families are in general smaller than 
rural families. Urban girls and boys have, on average, 2.6 siblings if they are beneficiaries and 2.3 
siblings if they are non-beneficiaries. In rural areas, beneficiary girls and boys have 3 siblings while 
non-beneficiaries have 2.8 siblings. Bigger families in a poor environment may face more difficulties in 
meeting their needs, thus depending more on governmental assistance. 
Table 3 includes sample means of the exogenous variables used in the parents’ work participation 
equations; these are given separately for parents in the beneficiary group and in the non-beneficiary 
(waiting-list) groups. Similarly, Table 4 shows the means for the matched sample of parents. Labor 
force participation rates are higher for the beneficiary group; they are also higher in rural areas than in 
urban areas.  
Table 3 shows that 42 percent of urban mothers who are beneficiaries and 38 percent of those who are 
not beneficiaries are working in the labor force, while more than 68 percent of rural mothers 
(regardless of beneficiary status) are in the labor force. More than 95 percent of rural fathers and 
approximately 80 percent of urban fathers are working in the labor force. Only mothers from urban 
areas show statistically significant differences in labor force participation – at the 10% level – between 
beneficiary and non-beneficiary. Indeed, it seems that conditional cash transfers may not impact 
parents’ work decisions. 
Tables 3 and 4 also show mothers’ and fathers’ educational levels as measured by their completed 
years of schooling. Mothers are in general more educated than fathers. However, most have not 
continued beyond the fifth grade. According to Table 3, urban mothers from beneficiary families have, 
on average, completed 4.1 years of schooling, while non-beneficiary urban mothers completed 4.7 
years. In rural areas educational attainment is even lower: 2.7 years for beneficiary and 3.1 years for 
non-beneficiary mothers. 
Fathers from urban areas have completed, on average, 3.6 years of schooling if their families are in the 
beneficiary group and 4.2 years of schooling if they are not in a beneficiary family (Table 3). As we 
observed for mothers, father’s educational attainment in rural areas is much lower than in urban areas – 
fathers in the treatment group in rural areas have 1.8 years, while those in the control group have 
completed an average of 2.3 years.    11
As we did for the children’s analysis, we compare the means of the variables in the treatment and 
control groups, indicating a lack of statistically significant difference by an asterisk.  In urban areas, 
most variables are statistically significant between groups, whereas in rural areas only about half differ. 
However, when using the propensity score matching method, as shown in Table 4, practically all the 
means of the exogenous variables in the treatment group are statistically the same as the means for the 
control group.   
Empirical Models 
The main goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the Bolsa Escola conditional cash transfer 
program on the work decisions of children, mothers and fathers and on children’s school enrollment. 
We assume that the family maximizes a utility function for all of its members, thus using a unitary 
model of time allocation. As mentioned above, although we recognize the evidence indicating the 
failure of unitary models to capture intrahousehold bargaining, we do not have adequate data to 
implement a collective model. 
We estimate the effect of treatment for both children and parents
10 looking at the impact of the benefits 
on the decision to work, estimating equations in which the dependent variables are the work status of 
children, mothers and fathers – that is, whether they performed some labor force work activity or not 
and also whether the child is enrolled in school or not. The explanatory variables are individual and 
household characteristics, as well whether or not they are receiving the grant. We estimate the labor 
force participation and enrollment equations conditional on cash transfers using a probit model.  
The empirical equation for labor force participation and school enrollment is 
0 1
J
ij j i i i j WX T α αδ ε
= =+ + + ∑  
where  i W  is an indicator variable that assumes the value 1 if the individual is working in the labor force 
or is in school, and 0 if not; i indexes individuals;  ji X  represents J individual, family and regional 
characteristics (or control variables); and  i T  is a binary variable that indicates whether or not the person 
belongs to the treatment group.  Its value is 1 if the child receives the grants and 0 otherwise. 
In both children’ and parents’ equations, individual characteristics included the person’s age and skin 
color (1 if they report themselves as white and zero otherwise). To represent household composition we 
used variables for the number of children in several groups broken down by age (0-5, 6-10, 11-15 and 
16+) and gender
11. Geographic differences were captured using dummy variables for each region 
(North, Northeast, South, Southeast and Midwest). 
Also, parents’ characteristics are included in children’s equations, as controls for family background. 
These variables describe the father’s age, the difference between father’s and mother’s age, and father’s 
and mother’s completed years of schooling. 
                                                 
10 We use unweighted data in the econometric analysis. For a discussion about the use weights in regression analysis, see 
duMochel and Duncan (1983), Korn and Graubard (1995), and Lohr and Liu (1994).  
11 In the children’s equations these variables represent the number of siblings (without counting the observed child) while in 




In this section we discuss the estimated outcomes of children and their parents, focusing on the 
exposition of a program that provides them an extra monthly income source but requires that children 
attend school. 
It is important to remember that data used refers mostly to the Bolsa Escola program, which joined 
other social programs in the broader Bolsa Família in 2004. Until 2003, however, the condition for 
receiving the monthly grants was children’s school attendance. As a consequence, measuring the 
effects of the Brazilian CCT program on child work and on their parents’ labor using PNAD-2003 is 
essentially investigating a spillover effect of a program aimed at increasing education.  
Again, the PNAD-2003 survey asked two different questions regarding the program – whether or not 
the person was receiving a transfer and whether or not the person had signed-up for a transfer but was 
not receiving it. The survey carried out in 2001 asked whether the person was receiving or had signed-
up for a conditional cash transfer program in the same question, aggregating both treated and “waiting 
for treatment” in one group. We expect that the change in the question – and consequently in the 
treatment and comparison groups – and the time span since the implementation in 2001 will lead to 
results different than those found in former research regarding child labor (Cardoso and Souza, 2003; 
Ferro and Kassouf, 2005). Parents’ labor decision under this program has not been studied before. 
Children’s outcomes. We perform separate estimations for children in urban and rural areas, besides 
the estimation for the whole sample. Moreover, in each case, we presented the impact of the Bolsa 
Escola program from the probit equations, using beneficiaries and eligible signed-up families as well 
the results from the propensity score matching method. This gives us six sets of results for the 
probability to work regressions and six for the children school enrollment equations. These are 
presented in table 5.  
We argued above that beneficiaries may be compared with eligible signed-up families who are not yet 
getting the benefits. These individuals have the same propensity to participate and are eligible. In 
principle they should be an appropriate comparison group. However, for some of the exogenous 
variables, means statistics of those who are in the program and those who are eligible and have applied 
but do not receive the program are statistically significant. Because of that, a propensity score matching 
method was applied. When using matching, the mean of the exogenous variables for the new sample of 
control and treatment groups are practically the same. 
The program impacts from the probit equations and from the matching method are very similar, 
showing robustness in the results. This was also true using different propensity score matching 
strategies, such as nearest neighbor (one-to-one), k-nearest neighbor, and Mahalanobis.  We also 
analyzed different sets of variables to identify the propensity scores, including income variables, 
interactions between parents’ education and income, parent’s age and education, household size and 
composition, and regions of residence. The results were always very similar. Three years after being 
adopted nationally, the Bolsa Escola CCT program seems to have had the expected effect on school 
enrollment, as shown in Table 5. The impact of Bolsa Escola on children school enrollment is positive   13
and statistically significant, ranging from 2 percentage points in urban areas up to 4 percentage points 
in rural areas. The impact is small, but this is not surprising given the high percentage of children 
already enrolled in school.  Program participation may have made a substantial impact on actual 
attendance, which we are unable to measure.  We also lack information about program impacts on 
actual learning.  Achievement may increase with attendance, but it may also decrease if schools’ 
resources have not been increased to match greater numbers of children attending. 
Also as expected, Bolsa Escola had a negative effect on children’s labor force work. This result is 
observed for both urban and rural areas. Participation in Bolsa Escola reduces the probability that a 
child works by 3 percentage points overall. For those living in urban areas the effect is a reduction in 2 
percentage points and for those living in rural areas, where the percentage of children working is 
higher, the impact is 6 or 9 percentage points, depending on which estimation method is used. These 
estimated effects show the largest differences in measured impacts observed, among all the significant 
estimates in Table 5.  
These results obtained for the impact of Bolsa Escola on child labor are different from previous ex-post 
evaluations, in which the program showed no effect in reducing child labor (Cardoso and Souza, 2003) 
or had an unexpected positive effect (Ferro and Kassouf, 2005). It may be that the time span between 
the implementation of the program and the evaluation was not enough to capture significant impacts
12. 
Although the results are now in the expected direction, it is perhaps surprising that the effect of 
conditional cash transfers on labor force work status seems relatively small.  These results, however, 
are consistent with Skoufias and Parker (2001), who find a negative program effect for Mexico’s 
PROGRESA of 3.2 percentage points on the labor force work of boys ages 12-17.  They also note that 
this is a relatively big percentage change (8.5%) given the boys’ pre-program level of labor force work 
(37.75%). In Brazil, it is likely that previously employed children reduced their labor force hours in 
order to accommodate more schooling, instead of leaving the labor force entirely.  Indeed, in an 
analysis of hours worked, we tentatively find that program participation results in a reduction of 1.8 
hours (for rural children) of labor force work per week, conditional on employment;  these results are 
not included here because of our dissatisfaction with  the identification of the selection equation.  
Parents’ outcomes.  What is the effect of an increase in household income due to governmental 
transfers on the work participation of adults – mothers and fathers? Assuming that children decrease 
their labor market work, as we can infer from the results described above, family labor supply is 
reduced. This could lead to an increase in the labor supply of other family members – parents – as the 
relative price of work would be higher for the whole family. However, taking into account the income 
effect on adult labor of cash transfers, parents could choose to work less. The final outcome is an 
empirical matter. 
As for children, we take into account the role of individual characteristics, such as education and age, 
family composition and geographic region, in explaining parents’ work decision. We performed 
separated estimations for mothers and fathers and for those living in urban and rural areas, using probit 
equations and propensity score matching methods, ending up with 10 sets of regressions. Results for 
                                                 
12 Even estimating equations with the same specifications as Ferro and Kassouf (2005) we find that the CCT program 
reduces child labor (boys and girls from 6-15 years) by 2.12 percentage points in urban areas and 5.31 percentage points in 
rural areas. Our findings are exactly opposite those of Ferro and Kassouf, due only to the use of a different sample.   14
the impact of Bolsa Escola participation variable, as estimated in these 10 regressions, are presented in 
Table 5. 
Cash transfers increase mothers’ work participation by 3 percentage points overall, according to both 
methods of estimation. When estimating probits separately for urban and rural areas, there was a 
similar increase of 3 percentage point for mothers in urban areas; there was no effect of cash transfers 
on mothers’ labor force work in rural areas. For fathers, the effect was also positive and significant, 
equal to 3 percentage points, for the whole sample and for urban areas, using the propensity score 
matching method.  We did not find an effect for fathers using probit regressions, and neither method 
found an effect for rural fathers.  
These results are important for program sustainability.  If parents’ labor force work participation were 
known to decline because of Bolsa, that could imply increased dependency on government transfers – 
an undesirable effect.  This could have influential political ramifications.  Current critics of the Bolsa 
program argue that parents will take advantage of the cash transfers to stop working (implying that they 
are lazy), buy liquor or other things not related to children’s needs, and thus the program will be 
ineffective in reducing poverty in the long run.  Our results provide evidence that this argument is no 
valid; they should thus enhance the program’s political feasibility.   
Given that parents eligible for the Bolsa program are typically adults with relatively little formal 
education, it is striking that they have been able to increase their labor force work. It is possible that 
they took advantage of other social programs to increase employment; but since no such programs were 
not coordinated with Bolsa, this seems unlikely.  Programs not coordinated with the CCT program 
should have affected program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries similarly.  
One possible interpretation is that as children’s time in the labor force diminishes, they not only spend 
more time studying but also take on some of their parents’ household tasks. This may be the case for 
urban girls, as 80% of beneficiaries and 76% of non-beneficiaries in the 10-15 year-old group do 
household chores.  Parents with fewer household responsibilities may thus be more likely to enter the 
labor market. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we estimated the impact of the Brazilian Bolsa Escola conditional cash transfer program 
on household work decisions and children’s school enrollment. The empirical strategy involved 
producing separate estimates of the children, mothers and fathers’ probability to be enrolled in school 
and to work, conditional on beneficiary status, using a probit estimation and propensity score matching 
methods.  The analysis sample included only program-eligible families; that is, families with children 
aged 6-15 and monthly per capita incomes below half of a national minimum salary (120 Reais). 
Finally, our treatment group was made up of children/parents receiving the benefit, while our 
comparison group was children/parents who had signed up for the program but did not actually 
received benefits. 
We conclude that the Bolsa Escola CCT program had a negative effect on children’s labor force 
employment, with a larger effect for children living in rural areas. The program reduced urban 
children´s probability of working by 2 to 3 percentage points and rural children’s probability by 6 to 9 
percentage points. These findings are contrary to preceding research specific to Bolsa Escola (although 
similar to those for Mexico’s PROGRESA). We believe that the change in the PNAD survey’s   15
questions about program participation and the longer time relative to program introduction are the 
reasons for the difference. We also conclude that the Bolsa Escola CCT program was effective in 
increasing children school enrollment – by 2 to 4 percentage points - although the percentage of 
children enrolled in school was already very high.  
The effect of cash transfers on parents’ work decisions has not been previously investigated for Brazil. 
We find that the program increased mothers’ and fathers’ probability of participation in labor force 
work. Urban mothers and urban fathers increased their probabilities of working in the labor force by 3 
percentage points.  
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Table 1.  Means of Children’s Variables – Rural, Urban, and Total Sample – by Control and Treatment Groups, using the 
Program Beneficiary plus Signed-up Sample 
 
 Rural    Urban   Total  
   Control  Treatment     Control Treatment      Control  Treatment   
Dependent Variables                
Work participation  0.220  0.262    0.058 0.064  *  0.096 0.134   
School enrollment  0.950  0.986    0.969 0.990    0.965 0.981   
                
Covariates                
Child                 
Age 9.708  11.373    9.710 11.204    9.708  11.373   
White (1)  0.315  0.271    0.322 0.290    0.315  0.271   
Male 0.511  0.521  *  0.513 0.510  * 0.511  0.521  * 
Fathers                 
Age 41.615  43.108    38.454 40.725    41.615  43.108   
Schooling 2.065  1.711    4.132 3.576    2.065  1.711   
Mothers                 
Age difference  5.294  4.692  *  3.889 4.202  * 5.294  4.692  * 
Schooling 2.789  2.449    4.449 3.966    2.789  2.449   
Number of siblings                  
ages 0-5  0.622  0.527    0.616 0.052    0.622  0.527   
ages 6-10, males  0.393  0.416  *  0.391 0.393  * 0.393  0.416  * 
ages 11-15, males  0.410  0.464  *  0.303 0.387    0.410  0.464  * 
ages 16+, males  0.350  0.534    0.221 0.325    0.350  0.534   
ages 6-10, females  0.405  0.427  *  0.344 0.372  * 0.405  0.427  * 
ages 11-15, females  0.393  0.395  *  0.284 0.371    0.393  0.395  * 
ages 16+, females  0.233  0.271  *  0.154 0.227    0.233  0.271  * 
Geographic region (3)                  
North 0.021  0.029  *  0.141 0.154  * 0.021  0.029  * 
Northeast 0.630  0.716    0.477 0.497  * 0.630  0.716   
South 0.113  0.079    0.114 0.082    0.113  0.079   
Southeast 0.158  0.123    0.200 0.170    0.158  0.123   
Mid-west 0.078  0.052    0.068 0.097    0.078  0.052   
Per capita family income (2)  52.542  46.834    63.362 60.233    52.542  46.834   
Number of observations  1001  3590    3229 6614     4230  10204   
                 
* difference is not statistically significant                
(1) Non-white includes black, mulatto, yellow and indigenous.             
(2) Without CCT transfers                  
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Table 2.  Matched Sample Means of Children’s Variables – Rural, Urban, and Total Sample – by Control and Treatment Groups 
 
 Rural    Urban   Total   
   Control  Treatment     Control Treatment      Control  Treatment   
Dependent Variables               
Work participation  0.348  0.261    0.090 0.064    0.166 0.134   
School enrollment  0.956  0.986    0.966 0.990    0.961 0.988   
                
Covariates                
Child               
Age 11.521  11.374  *  11.269 11.206  * 11.364  11.265   
White (1)  0.288  0.271  *  0.294 0.290  *  0.295  0.283  * 
Male 0.503  0.521  *  0.504 0.510  *  0.509  0.514  * 
Fathers                 
Age 43.176  43.118  *  40.733 40.789  * 41.550  41.614  * 
Schooling 1.785  1.712  *  3.718 3.563   3.063  2.908   
Mothers                 
Age difference  4.846  4.704  *  4.163 4.203  *  4.365  4.380  * 
Schooling 2.567  2.452  *  4.112 3.963   3.583  3.428   
Number of siblings                  
ages 0-5  0.560  0.530  *  0.509 0.520  *  0.511  0.523  * 
ages 6-10, males  0.593  0.597  *  0.591 0.591  *  0.584  0.593  * 
ages 11-15, males  0.794  0.800  *  0.687 0.700  *  0.729  0.735  * 
ages 16+, males  0.469  0.533    0.317 0.327  *  0.381  0.400  * 
ages 6-10, females  0.627  0.614  *  0.567 0.573  *  0.595  0.588  * 
ages 11-15, females  0.734  0.686    0.660 0.660  *  0.688  0.669  * 
ages 16+, females  0.278  0.271  *  0.227 0.230  *  0.243  0.244  * 
Geographic region (3)                  
North 0.024  0.029  *  0.155 0.153  *  0.110  0.109  * 
Northeast 0.680  0.715    0.490 0.496  *  0.555  0.573  * 
South 0.097  0.080  *  0.085 0.082  *  0.083  0.081  * 
Mid-west 0.056  0.052  *  0.092 0.098  *  0.091  0.082  * 
Rural            0.323  0.354   
Family Income Variables                  
Per capita family income (2)  48.062  46.960  *  60.310 60.041  * 56.810  55.410   
* difference is not statistically significant                
(1) Non-white includes black, mulatto, yellow and indigenous.             
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Table 3.  Means of Parents’ Variables – Rural, Urban and Total Sample –  by Control and Treatment Groups, using the Program 
Beneficiary plus Signed-up Sample 
 
   Rural    Urban    Total   
   Control  Treatment    Control  Treatment    Control  Treatment   
Mothers                
Dependent Variable                
Work Participation  0.681  0.722  *  0.379 0.422    0.447 0.525   
Covariates                
Schooling 3.067  2.569    4.672 4.080    4.291 3.557   
Age 35.786  38.442    34.538 36.618    34.882 37.244   
White (1)  0.339  0.284  *  0.320 0.276    0.319 0.280   
Head of the family  0.018  0.015  *  0.075 0.061  *  0.060 0.046   
Fathers                
Dependent Variable                
Work Participation  0.959  0.956  *  0.803 0.815  *  0.838 0.863   
Covariates                
Schooling 2.294  1.786    4.219 3.628    3.757 2.998   
Age 41.222  43.006    38.264 40.731    38.928 41.537   
White (1)  0.318  0.379  *  0.328 0.285    0.321 0.284   
Head of the family  0.982  0.985  *  0.925 0.939    0.940 0.954   
Parents                
Covariates                
Number of kids                 
ages 0-5  0.623  0.517    0.634 0.527    0.641 0.519   
ages 6-10, males  0.596  0.526  *  0.593 0.529    0.611 0.520   
ages 11-15, males  0.445  0.663    0.398 0.582    0.403 0.614   
ages 16+, males  0.306  0.517    0.215 0.322    0.243 0.388   
ages 6-10, females  0.614  0.527  *  0.571 0.497    0.570 0.511   
ages 11-15, females  0.382  0.576    0.354 0.554    0.381 0.555   
ages 16+, females  0.218  0.268  *  0.162 0.231    0.171 0.245   
Geographic region (2)                 
North 0.024  0.029  *  0.126 0.145    0.104 0.105  * 
Northeast 0.602  0.705    0.497 0.511    0.518 0.579   
South 0.118  0.090  *  0.109 0.082    0.113 0.083   
Southeast 0.182  0.120    0.202 0.167    0.197 0.151   
Mid-west 0.075  0.057  *  0.067 0.086    0.068 0.082   
Family Income Variables                 
Per capita family income (2)  55.401  50.443    65.005 62.378    62.852 58.260   
Number of observations  510  2031     1824 3837    2334 5868    
                
* difference is not statistically significant               
(1) Non-white includes black, mulatto, yellow and indigenous.          
(2) without CCT                   20
 
Table 4.  Matched Sample Means of Parents’ Variables – Rural, Urban, and Total Sample –  by Control and Treatment Groups  
 
   Rural     Urban     Total    
   Control  Treatment     Control  Treatment     Control  Treatment    
Mothers                
Dependent Variable                
Work Participation  0.715  0.721  *  0.401 0.420  *  0.496 0.524  * 
Covariates                
Schooling 2.651  2.587  *  4.086 4.074  *  3.522 3.557  * 
Age 38.518  38.396  *  36.669 36.683  *  37.304 37.278  * 
White (1)  0.282  0.284  *  0.287 0.278  *  0.295 0.280  * 
Head of the family  0.023  0.016  *  0.065 0.061  *  0.046 0.046  * 
Fathers                
Dependent Variable                
Work Participation  0.954  0.956  *  0.783 0.815    0.833 0.864   
Covariates                
Schooling 1.834  1.802  *  3.628 3.630  *  2.993 2.998  * 
Age 43.216  43.014  *  40.957 40.782  *  41.732 41.554  * 
White (1)  0.285  0.279  *  0.296 0.287  *  0.287 0.284  * 
Head of the family  0.980  0.984  *  0.934 0.938  *  0.951 0.954  * 
Parents                
Covariates                
Number of kids                 
ages 0-5  0.510  0.518  *  0.510 0.519  *  0.496 0.519  * 
ages 6-10, males  0.510  0.517  *  0.505 0.521  *  0.517 0.520  * 
ages 11-15, males  0.675  0.667  *  0.589 0.587  *  0.611 0.615  * 
ages 16+, males  0.493  0.515  *  0.334 0.321  *  0.385 0.388  * 
ages 6-10, females  0.584  0.533  *  0.489 0.499  *  0.523 0.511  * 
ages 11-15, females  0.596  0.563  *  0.556 0.551  *  0.568 0.555  * 
ages 16+, females  0.256  0.267  *  0.243 0.234  *  0.247 0.246  * 
Geographic region (2)                 
North 0.028  0.030  *  0.147 0.145  *  0.109 0.105  * 
Northeast 0.697  0.702  *  0.499 0.514  *  0.561 0.579  * 
South 0.811  0.879  *  0.084 0.081  *  0.087 0.083  * 
Mid-west 0.068  0.057  *  0.091 0.096  *  0.085 0.082  * 
Rural            0.335 0.346  * 
Family Income Variables                 
   Per capita family income(2)  51.467  50.470  *  62.631 62.398  *  58.571 58.274  * 
* difference is not statistically significant               
(1) Non-white includes black, mulatto, yellow and indigenous.          
(2) without CCT                   21
Table 5.  Impacts of Brazil’s Bolsa Escola CCT Program on Children’s Work 
Participation and School Enrollment and Mother / Father Work Participation 
 
Results are the marginal effects of the CCT variable using both probit and propensity 
score matching methods. 
 
      Impact of CCT on Work Participation 




t-stat  ATT 
(matching)  t-stat 
 
Children   -0.02818 -5.29***    -0.03173  -4.40***
 
Children Urban  -0.01828 -4.15***    -0.02528  -3.84***
 Rural  -0.05877 -3.44***    -0.08701  -4.42***
        
Mothers   0.02581 1.98**    0.02811  1.89*
 
Mothers Urban  0.02729 1.88*    0.01910  1.14
 Rural  0.01352 0.60    0.00601  0.22
        
Fathers   0.00750 0.93    0.03028  2.78***
 
Fathers Urban  0.01275 1.12    0.03203  2.35**
 Rural  -0.00163 -0.18    0.00117  0.10
        
        





t-stat   ATT 
(matching)  t-stat 
 
Children   0.02545 9.63***   0.02733  6.81***
 
Children Urban  0.02056 7.28***   0.02374  5.48***
   Rural  0.03904 6.58***    0.02947  3.14***
      
*** significant at 1% level 
** significant at 5% level 
* significant at 10% level 
 